By Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty

n October 17, India announced its decision to withdraw some of the forces it has concentrated on its international border with Pakistan since December 2001. Pakistan announced its decision to reciprocate the following day. This de-escalation which Pakistan had been seeking, and the rest of the international community was urging, will come about after two sets of elections.

The state elections held in Indian-occupied Kashmir which marked the tenth time India tried to gain a semblance of democratic legitimacy, produced results that did not suit the BJP government in New Delhi which found it necessary to introduce presidential rule in the state.

The other elections, held in Pakistan that India may have sought to influence through its attempted intimidation proceeded smoothly, without creating an opportunity for India to obtain political advantage. One can only guess that if the military regime in Pakistan had not fulfilled its commitment to restore democratic governance India might have sought to exploit the situation. That opportunity also did not materialize.

The BJP government's deliberate decision to resort to coercion rather than conciliation was based on a perception that the events of 9/11 had created an opportunity to pressure Pakistan over Kashmir. India had achieved a degree of success in establishing a linkage between the intifada in Kashmir and the jihadi organizations straddling Taliban-held Afghanistan, and Pakistan. President Clinton, during his visit to South Asia in March 2000, had acknowledged this linkage by setting up a joint US-India working group on terrorism. This took cognizance of the fact that the US missile attack against Afghanistan in August 1998 had hit some members of the Harkatul Mujahideen, who were known to be active in Kashmir. Consequently, there was eager anticipation in New Delhi that the war against terror in Afghanistan would naturally extend to the activities of the jihadi groups in Kashmir.

Geography played a major part in the critical role assumed by Pakistan in the first operations launched against terror in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, against targets in the US. India's immediate reaction had been almost gleeful, in the certain expectation that as Pakistan had been backing the Taliban, the US would also eventually target it. India had hastened to offer to the US not only its land, sea and air bases but also the full backing of its armed forces.

The one country whose political and logistical support was critical for the planned US military campaign was Pakistan, which has a 2,500 kilometres long border with Afghanistan, surrounding the land-locked country on the east and south. Therefore, President Bush urgently, sought Pakistan's participation in the coalition against terrorism, without taking much notice of India's keenness to join in the war against terrorism. He also made it clear that those not joining the coalition would be deemed to be on the side of the terrorists. President Musharraf displayed adroitness in making a decision, and not only did he join the coalition, but also offered unstinted cooperation. Given the relevance of Pakistan's total support to the US operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan emerged as a major ally of the US in the war against terrorism. This turn of events became a source of great frustration for New Delhi.

As the US proceeded with its military build-up, depending substantially on Pakistan's intelligence and logistic support, India stepped up its efforts to highlight Pakistan's support to jihadist groups. Before the US launched its operations against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, a "terrorist" incident happened in Srinagar against the Kashmir Assembly on October 1 and blamed on Pakistan-based terrorist groups. As this did not affect the close Pakistan-US cooperation against terrorism, a major terrorist incident, this time targeting the Indian parliament, was stage-managed on December 13, and blamed on named jihadist groups, namely Lashkar-i-Taiba, and Jaish-i-Mohammad, that were known to have their headquarters in Pakistan. Though Pakistan condemned the attack, India proceeded to hold Islamabad responsible, without any formal inquiry, and took a series of actions predicated on blame being assigned to Pakistan.

The post December 13 measures marked the beginning of coercive diplomacy, through a series of moves that included ending of land. sea and air communications, withdrawal of high commissioner, halving of diplomatic staff, and the most serious concentration of land, sea and air forces by India along its borders with Pakistan. Pakistan was obliged to reciprocate, except that it did not withdraw its high commissioner till he was "expelled" by India in May 2002. India also called for the surrender to India of 20 terrorists, majority of them non-Pakistanis. President Musharraf had responded to these measures with restraint, and took a significant step towards reining in Jihadists and militant organizations through his address to the nation on January 12, 2002.

The address, which even the BJP leadership in India called "path-breaking", did not lead to any reduction in the menacing Indian concentrations along Pakistan's borders. President Musharraf had banned five Jihadi groups, including those named by India, and announced that Pakistan was committed to eliminating terrorism in all its manifestations. However, the coercive approach was maintained for another nine months, the justification offered being that Pakistan had not stopped "cross-border terrorism", or had not handed over the 20 terrorists, though India had refused to provide proof of guilt of the named persons. Various vague deadlines were mentioned from time to time, such as end of winter, when local elections were due in India, in the hope that the confrontation might improve the prospects of the BJP. This did not happen, and President Musharraf's call for de-escalation, and for resumption of a dialogue continued to fall on deaf ears.

The effort at intimidation was further intensified after the referendum held in Pakistan by President Muharraf on April 30. Various terrorist incidents were cited to justify threats of decisive military action, and as Pakistan declared its resolve to defend itself, the international opinion became concerned over the threat of a conflict between the nuclear armed neighbours.

By that time, the Indian leadership had begun talking about maintaining the coercive approach till October, when the two sets of elections were scheduled. Indian spokesmen maintain that they have "achieved their aims and objectives" and have acted independently of any external pressures. At the same time, the withdrawal would not be followed by a resumption of dialogue, since "cross-border terrorism" is continuing.

The belated decision to de-escalate reflects a realization that the attempt at coercion had proved futile. Indeed, given the impact of the ten-month standoff on the morale of the Indian armed forces, it has proved to be counterproductive. According to Indian analysts, there was a three-fold increase in incidents of indiscipline, and recently, evidence of the tattered morale of the Indian security forces was seen at the Wagah border where the Indian soldier participating in a regular border ceremony lost control of himself. Even financially, the costs have been mush higher for India, whose economy also suffered from the departure of thousands of expatriate investors.

The most significant effect of the eyeball to eyeball confrontation created by the Indian attempt at intimidation has been to highlight the need to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The US and the EU are now fully alive to the risks of this standoff, and the missile tests India and Pakistan have carried out over this period have added to the sense of urgency to address the basic cause of tension.

There is now broad international support for the resumption of a dialogue that Pakistan has been urging, as the most practical means of ending tensions, and resolving problems peacefully. The Indian prime minister is expected to attend the SAARC summit due to be held in Islamabad in January 2003. He has been claiming the credit for initiating the process that began with the Lahore Declaration in 1999, and was resumed at Agra in July 2001. India's attempt to capitalize on the 9/11 events and to use coercion has proved futile, and the withdrawals now announced will create the opening to resume that dialogue. Given the growing incidence of poverty in this region, the political leadership owes it to the toiling masses to move towards a peaceful resolution of all disputes, including the core issue of Kashmir.

Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty is an eminent career diplomat and represented Pakistan in multiple countries as an Envoy. 

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© 2002 Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty

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